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Abstract 
A number of macroeconomic theories, very popular in the 1980s, seem to have completely 
disappeared and been replaced by the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
approach. We will argue that this replacement is due to a tacit agreement on a number of 
assumptions, previously seen as mutually exclusive, and not due to a settlement by ‘nature’. 
As opposed to econometrics and microeconomics and despite massive progress in the access 
to data and the use of statistical software, macroeconomic theory appears not to be a 
cumulative science so far. Observational equivalence of different models and the problem of 
identification of parameters of the models persist as will be highlighted by examining two 
examples: one in growth theory and a second in testing inflation persistence.  
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« ‘Nothing is vanity; on to science, and forward!’ cries the modern Ecclesiastes, that is to say 
Everyone in the world. And yet, the cadavers of the bad and the lazy fall on the hearts of 
others... Ah! quick, quick a bit, over there; beyond the night, these future, eternal, rewards... 
do we escape them? ... » Rimbaud A. 1873, A Season in Hell, Lightning. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Mainstream macroeconomic theories of the 80s, such as monetarism, real business cycle 
theory, fixed-price disequilibrium theory, and ad hoc dynamic models not based on optimal 
saving, seem to have completely disappeared and belong now to the history of economic 
ideas. They were replaced by the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) theory. 
Nonetheless, controversies on macroeconomic theory were not settled and scientific progress 
is not achieved: «For more than three decades, macroeconomics has gone backward» (Romer 
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2016, 1). This paper investigates what are possible reasons for the adoption of the DSGE 
model and why it will probably not be the end of disagreement in macroeconomics, especially 
with respect to the gap between normative and positive economics.  
Latour (1988) puts forward that controversies are a typical step of ‘science in the making’. 
Long-lasting scientific controversies, however, signal a failure to accumulate knowledge. 
Macroeconomic theory appears to be a case where data seem to be unable to settle 
controversies, such as adaptive expectations versus rational expectations (Pesaran 1981, 
1987). Other factors than data may decide on what could be the prevalent theory at a given 
point in time (Colander 2009). Hendry (2005) emphasizes that theory driven approaches, 
since their credibility depends on the transient credibility of rapidly evolving theory, induce 
transient and non-structural evidence, «But postulating an endless sequence of models and 
theories that get rejected in turn fails to incorporate learning from the evidence.»  
Since one of the aims of macroeconomics is to give policy advice, macroeconomics is prone 
to controversy because of conflicting interests in society. The political opinion of the 
researcher or the belief in market forces may influence the way he derives his economic 
model. Furthermore, macro-econometrics faces more difficulties than micro-econometrics, 
not only because macro-econometrics looks at several markets instead of a single one, but 
also due to the difficulties that arise from the observational equivalence of different theories 
and from parameter identification and endogeneity issues. Identification issues are at the 
juncture between two broadly defined distinct methodological approaches of macroeconomic 
theory: normative, theory-first or theory-driven (Hendry 2005, Juselius and Franchi 2007, 
Spanos 2009) and Walrasian approach (De Vroey 2016), such as New-Keynesian DSGE 
models, versus positive, data-first or Marshallian approach, such as structural vector auto-
regressive (SVAR) models (Kilian and Lütkepohl 2017). These identification issues have 
been highlighted among others in Pesaran (1981), Beyer and Farmer (2004, 2008), Canova 
and Sala (2009), Blanchard (2016), and Romer (2016). Marchionatti and Sella (2017) argue 
that it is the Neo-Walrasian legacy of DSGE models that led to the poor predictive 
performance and the interpretational weakness of these models.  
We highlight a number of facts why DGSE models avoid falsification, so that data cannot 
settle controversies. Pesaran (1981, 1987), Binder and Pesaran (1995), Canova (2009 and 
2012), and Koop et al. (2013) demonstrate that the solutions of rational expectations ‘New 
Keynesian’ DSGE models are observationally equivalent to adaptive expectations ‘Old 
Keynesian’ vector auto-regressive (VAR) models. It is not possible to test one theory against 
the other one when their predictions are identical, although they use different hypothesis. 
Hence, it is impossible to settle the controversy of rational expectations against adaptive 
expectations using data.  
It is then usually argued that DSGE models are superior to adaptive expectations VAR 
models because they are based on intertemporal microeconomic foundation. The theoretical 
discipline of micro-foundations is empirically justified by the endogeneity of macroeconomic 
policy instruments leading to parameter identification problems (Lucas 1976).
1
 Omitting the 
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endogeneity of the policy instruments may lead to biased parameters of macroeconomic 
policy transmission equations. This endogeneity bias may change if the policy-rule 
parameters determining the endogeneity of the policy instruments change. This specification 
error of macroeconomic policy transmission mechanisms may lead to policy mistakes. Kilian 
and Lütkepohl (2017), section 6.3.6, argue that reduced form structural VAR may also 
conduct policy analysis taking into account the endogeneity of policy rules. But micro 
foundation does not solve all the remaining identification and observational equivalence 
issues when testing macroeconomic theory.  
Some micro-foundations may imply too many structural parameters with respect to reduced 
form parameters, i.e. under-identification of the statistical model used to test the theory 
(Canova 2012). When facing a problem of parameter identification, a useful normative 
macroeconomic theory can be a useless positive macroeconomic theory. In what follows we 
will present the example of empirical studies of convergence where optimal growth was not - 
and could not be tested against the Solow growth model, because the key parameter of 
preferences of optimal growth was not identified.  
Furthermore, some micro-foundations correspond to misspecified models. For example, 
they do not fit the hump-shaped impulse responses describing the persistence of 
macroeconomic time-series obtained with adaptive expectations vector auto-regressive 
models including two lags (Estrella and Fuhrer 2002). In order to fit persistence, new-
Keynesian DSGE models are hybrid models mixing rational expectations and ad hoc adaptive 
expectations. They add ad hoc lagged dependent variables (inflation and habit persistence, for 
example) and/or ad hoc auto-correlation parameters of shocks, which are not grounded by 
micro-foundations. As an example, we compare these two observationally equivalent models 
with an observationally equivalent VAR model with adaptive expectations. Because the 
persistence parameters are ad hoc in the New-Keynesian model and not derived from micro-
foundations (criterion 1), we propose three alternative criteria other than micro-foundation to 
compare the three models of persistence. The VAR model with adaptive expectations includes 
fewer parameters (criterion 2), some of the parameters of the New-Keynesian DSGE model 
may be not identified (criterion 3) and the interpretation of some parameters is opaque, 
complicated, and counter-intuitive (criterion 4).  
Additionally, micro-foundations add opacity on identification issues because reduced form 
parameters are highly non-linear functions of preferences and technology parameters. «The 
treatment of identification now is no more credible than in the early 1970s but escapes 
challenge because it is so much more opaque.» (Romer 2016, 1) These technicalities have 
been handled in Canova and Sala (2009), Iskrev (2010), Komunjer and Ng (2011), Canova 
(2012), Koop et al. (2013). So far, they had no feedback on changing the specifications of 
New-Keynesian DSGE theory in order to reduce weak identification issues. 
 Successful theories are designed to many allies among researchers. A successful normative, 
theory-first macroeconomic theory is likely to satisfy this necessary Darwinian survival of the 
fittest criterion, in order to be protected from its empirical falsification: Design ‘not even 
wrong’ observationally equivalent theories to pre-existing theories, which may include too 
many parameters for identifying them with available data and which may face opaque weak 
identification issues. Hence, controversies on parameters cannot be settled. These theories 
allow multiple interpretations, numerous variations and combinations in subsequent papers, 
controversies, citations and fame. These theories are likely to be relatively more sophisticated 
and to attract many allies among bright scholars. Ockham’s razor of parsimony of the number 
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of parameters of a theory is not rewarding for academic careers. It removes too many 
opportunities of publications and citations.  
There is a complementarity between the persistence of controversy in macroeconomics and 
macro-econometrics and the researcher’s incentives to preserve the theoretical ‘discipline’ of 
their theory-first approach, while deliberately selecting observationally equivalent theories 
and forgetting discipline with respect to identification issues when using econometrics.  
Our plan is as follows: In the next section we argue that four competing theories of the 
1980s ran out of fashion and have been replaced by dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
models. In section 3, we distinguish a normative and a positive approach to economic 
questions with optimal growth theory as an example. In a fourth section, we compare the 
adaptive expectations vector auto-regressive model and the rational expectations DSGE 
model with respect to the problems of observational equivalence and identification of 
parameters. In section 5, we develop some criteria to decide which of different competing 
theories to take and try to make a forecast for future of the DSGE model. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. EX-FAN OF THE 1980S: THE ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION OF MACROECONOMIC THEORIES 
2.1. Dead macroeconomic theories 
Leijonhufvud (2006) and De Vroey (2016) use the movement of climbing a decision tree as 
a metaphor to describe the change of thought in macroeconomics. Each fork is seen as a 
decision to pursue the one or the other idea. Sometimes researchers get stuck on one of the 
lower branches. Then, they backtrack to an earlier bifurcation, restart another approach, and 
the dead-end theory dies. A number of indicators, besides the judgments of researchers 
themselves and historians of macroeconomics, may measure the decreasing interest of 
theories: They are not used or cited in current research (see appendix), no recent PhD thesis is 
built on them, they are not used for current policy advice, they are neither mentioned in 
current master level textbooks, nor in current undergraduate level textbooks, they are 
mentioned mostly by historians of economic thought. This loss of interest may be sudden or 
gradually, a few ones may even be resurrected.  
We will briefly introduce four deceased mainstream macroeconomic theories of the 80s 
with an extract from their respective obituaries. In doubt, ask yourself: If a master student 
comes to your office and argues that he would like to do a PhD using one of the following 80s 
theories, would you accept to be his PhD advisor?  
2.1.1. Monetarism 
Monetarism stressed the importance of policy rules for monetary aggregates in order to 
fight inflation, based on the quantitative theory of money, an old economic idea with already 
an impressive literature. Emerging in the 50s, it was American-based with a prominent 
Chicago Nobel prize winner with political clout, institutional support in the Fed, the 
Bundesbank, and other central banks. Monetarism is credited for the monetary policy success 
of the sharp disinflation of the early 80s in the US, the UK, and continental Europe. Since the 
2000s, no PhD in monetary economics hired in a Central Bank research department, refers to 
Friedman’s monetarism. The official obituary notice is short: The estimate of the velocity of 
money is not stable (see Taylor’s (2001) interview with Milton Friedman as stated in De 
Vroey (2016)). A Taylor rule on the federal funds rate replaced Friedman’s monetary rules. In 
the 80s, monetarists would have ironically grinned at forecasts (nobody made) of the death of 
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such a powerful theory in the 90s. A resurrection of monetarism in the near future is unlikely. 
Quantitative easing seemingly led to negligible increases of inflation and of real output in 
Japan, US, UK, and the Euro-area in recent years.  
2.1.2. Ad hoc rational expectations or Keynesian models not based on optimal savings 
Regardless of their school of thought and the varieties of their ideas, a large market share of 
macroeconomic models in the 80s were static or dynamic models not based on optimal 
savings derived from intertemporal microfoundations (for example, Dornbusch’s (1976) 
rational expectations model of the overshooting of exchange rate). It has been somehow 
forgotten that, not only Keynesian models, including large scale forecasting models in central 
banks and treasuries, but also many small scale rational expectations models were not based 
on intertemporal optimal savings at the time. In the 1990s, optimal savings based on the 
intertemporal substitution effect of the interest rate on consumption, with infinite (Ramsey) or 
finite horizon in overlapping generation models, turned out to be of compulsory use in 
mainstream macroeconomics. This was fostered by theories of endogenous growth, of the 
open economy, and of real business cycles. The obituary notice says: Either they were static 
models with optimal choice or they we dynamic models lacking intertemporal microeconomic 
foundations. Any macroeconomic idea which cannot be introduced into a dynamic model 
assuming Ramsey optimal saving infinite horizon (overlapping generation model) or in 
infinite horizon for a proportion of households is a dead idea. 
  
2.1.3. Disequilibrium macroeconomics assuming quantity rationing on goods and labour 
market 
 As a subset of the models of section 2.1.2, this theory assumed price rigidity with excess 
supply or excess demand using static models and econometrics. It was French and Belgium-
based without a Nobel prize awarded. The obituary notice mentions: It did not find allies 
among US-based macroeconomists. Researchers and their PhDs shifted to endogenous growth 
theory or overlapping generation (OLG) models or macro-econometrics or real business 
cycles or microeconomics or retired.  
 
2.1.4. Real business cycles 
Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) real business cycle (RBC) theory claimed monetary policy 
ineffectiveness while rejecting econometrics. It was referred to as ‘dark ages’ by John Taylor. 
It was American-based with two future Nobel-prize winners. It is possible that a bureaucratic 
labour market of policy makers has killed RBC theory. As the Fed and later the ECB and 
other central banks have a large market share of jobs for PhDs in monetary macroeconomics it 
was not sustainable in the medium run to hire staff and consultants only able to produce 
variations of RBC denying any use of central banks. Due to these circumstances, there is no 
obituary notice. However, Romer (2016) and De Vroey (2016) consider that there is a 
continuity between RBC and New-Keynesian DSGE models. This is further discussed in the 
next section. 
 Graduate-level macroeconomic theories which emerged in the 70s and flourished and 
prospered in the 80s faced depreciation in the 90s. A few economists, however, emphasized 
the surprising resilience of the 40s IS-LM model in undergraduate macroeconomic textbooks 
to understand economic policy during the 2007... economic crisis.  
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Where does this lack of cumulative knowledge come from? Are modern macroeconomic 
theories only driven by creative destructions, by new theories, doomed to be destructed later 
on? Are they, as asset price bubbles, only driven by fads and fashions for a given generation 
of macroeconomists with a time-period of 25 years? 
2.2. New-Keynesian DSGE theory 
Starting in the 1990s, New-Keynesian DSGE models drove out the above-mentioned 
theories. Is this a change of paradigm or just a transitory phenomenon? Drakopoulos and 
Karayiannis (2005), Duarte (2016) and De Vroey (2016) recommend to limit calling any 
creative destruction of paradigms a scientific revolution in the sense of Kuhn. The creative 
destruction of short-lived attempts to expand knowledge, with limited scope of explanation 
and with fragile empirical validation, is not equivalent to a major scientific revolution. The 
New-Keynesian DSGE theory is rather a mutation or a collage of existing theories. It resulted 
from a bargain between a few researchers in the real business cycle group and in the New-
Keynesian group between 1992 to 1997, at the expense of Friedman’s monetarism, of 
Prescott’s monetary policy ineffectiveness, and models not based on Ramsey optimal savings. 
It is a combination of five existing elements:  
(1) Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) exogenous auto-regressive forcing variable, adding as 
many exogenous serially correlated forcing variables as time-series used in the estimation of 
New-Keynesian DSGE models.  
(2) Calvo’s (1983) staggered price-setting, leading to the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, 
where the expectation of future inflation is negatively correlated to an increase of the current 
output gap, as opposed to the accelerationist Phillips curve.  
(3) Ramsey’s (1928) optimal saving, where the future consumption is expected to increase 
following a rise of the real interest rate. The monetary policy transmission mechanism is 
based on this intertemporal substitution effect of the interest rate instead of the cost of capital.  
(4) A Taylor (1993) rule: the interest rate set by monetary policy responds to the deviation 
of inflation from its target rate and to an output gap. Monetary aggregates are not necessary to 
explain monetary policy.  
(5) Blanchard and Kahn’s (1980) unique solution for dynamic systems, with the ad hoc 
assumption of the policy instrument (interest rate) and the policy targets (inflation and output 
gap) to be simultaneously forward-looking variables.  
The core of the bargain was on agreeing to assume simultaneously assumptions (1) and (2): 
On the real business cycle side, King agreed to include assumption (2) ad hoc price rigidity 
for a proportion of firms over time (Calvo’s (1983) price setting), which the Real Business 
Cycles group had doctrinally refused to assume for the ten to fifteen years before.  
On the New-Keynesian side, Rotemberg, Woodford, and Galí agreed to include assumption 
(1) ad hoc auto-regressive and possibly negative productivity shocks (Kydland and Prescott 
(1982)), which the New-Keynesian group had doctrinally refused to assume for the ten to 
fifteen years before.  
While replacing the four theories mentioned above, New-Keynesian DSGE theory picked 
some of their assumptions and rejected others:  
Monetarism: The New-Keynesian DSGE theory claims that monetary policy matters but 
not monetary aggregates. For the monetary policy transmission channel, it substituted a 
dynamic version of the quantitative theory of money (monetary aggregates have an effect on 
future output and prices) by the New-Keynesian Phillips curve. For the monetary policy rule, 
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it substituted any type of monetary rule by the Taylor rule, using the interest rate as a policy 
instrument responding to the output gap and to the deviation of inflation from its target.  
Ad hoc macroeconomic models without optimal saving: The New-Keynesian DSGE 
theory assumes that savings behaviour is derived from Ramsey intertemporal optimization. In 
downturns, the poorer the representative household is and the lower its relative fluctuation 
aversion, the larger are his savings in order to get back to its equilibrium stock of wealth. In 
booms, the richer the representative household is and the lower its relative fluctuation 
aversion, the lower are his savings in order to get back to its equilibrium stock of wealth.  
Disequilibrium macroeconomics: The New-Keynesian DSGE theory does not assume that 
there is disequilibrium in quantities (neither excess demand nor excess supply) on the goods 
and the labour market, although it includes Calvo’s (1983) assumption that a proportion of 
firms exogenously face price rigidities in each period.  
Real business cycles: De Vroey (2016) and Romer (2016) consider that New Keynesian 
DSGE modelers are in the continuity of real business cycles models. Both approaches assume 
a Ramsey optimal saving model, as did the endogenous growth models. This is, for sure, a 
very constraining hypothesis for macroeconomic theory. However, there are several important 
changes which also suggest the death of the genuine project of real business cycles: monetary 
policy matters, some of the shocks are demand or monetary shocks, instead of only supply 
and productivity shocks. They use econometric (Bayesian) estimation of some of the 
parameters instead of calibrating all parameters. They assume staggered price-setting and 
price rigidity. They state the ad hoc hypothesis that policy instruments are forward-looking 
when policy targets are forward-looking. This implies positive-feedback policy rule 
parameters, which are not derived from first principles with an optimal policy makers 
behaviour as opposed to Ramsey optimal policy. They expand the number of auto-regressive 
shocks to be equal to the number of forward variables (instead of using only one measured 
time series of the productivity supply shocks).  
The New-Keynesian model is a bargain on two elementary theoretical assumptions and 
three other core elements between leaders of opinions in theoretical macroeconomics around 
1997. This new model had no formal and mathematical difficulty, adding together 
components already available in the economic literature. To the five compulsory elements are 
added a large number of variations (credit frictions, search on the labour market, open 
economies, ...), a patchwork of already existing elements that sometimes do not go together 
well, especially if the target is to explain the relationship between macroeconomic policy and 
macroeconomic variables and to advise policy makers.  
One example of elements that do not go together well is the combination of (4) and (5) with 
the ad hoc assumption that the policy instrument and the policy target are simultaneously 
forward-looking variables. This leads to the unbelievable mechanism of a positive-feedback 
policy rule in order to stabilize inflation. «In New-Keynesian models, higher inflation leads 
the Fed to set interest rates in a way that produces even higher future inflation. For only one 
value of inflation today will inflation fail to explode. » (Cochrane 2011).  
This ad hoc positive-feedback policy rule is the opposite of the negative-feedback 
mechanism of the two original papers. Taylor’s rule (1993) is a negative-feedback rule 
leaning against inflation spirals assuming that inflation is backward-looking (Cochrane 2011). 
Blanchard and Kahn’s (1980) condition for a unique solution (determinacy) of ad hoc linear 
rational expectations systems is an extension of the unique solution of the optimal-control 
linear-quadratic regulator (Vaughan 1970) for optimal negative-feedback rules. They rename 
‘costate’ variables (policy instruments) of the Hamiltonian system in Vaughan (1970) 
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‘forward-looking’ variables of their ad hoc linear system, and ‘state’ variables (policy targets) 
of the Hamiltonian system ‘backward-looking’ variables. In the Blanchard/Kahn (1980) 
setting, it is up to the researcher to decide which variables are forward-looking and which are 
backward-looking.  
Most macroeconomists abandoned their former ‘school of thought’ of the 80s. They were 
versatile and recycled themselves quickly to a new one. In despair of cumulative science, a 
few positivists may appeal to a nostalgia narrative: There may remain a flavor of the spirit of 
80s theory where we could decipher a far-fetched analogy, inheritance, influence in the New-
Keynesian DSGE theory, with at least the reference to two common very broad stylized facts: 
price rigidity and monetary policy. 
 
2.3. Facts that do not go away? 
 
Duarte (2012) initially put forward Blanchard’s view that stylized facts ‘do not go away’ as 
key driver of the New-Keynesian DSGE models’ creative destruction of other theories. After 
detailed investigation, Duarte (2015) is more balanced. Stylized facts on business cycles 
remained controversial with trend versus cycle decomposition. Demand shocks versus supply 
shocks did not lead to clear-cut results. Duarte acknowledges that other factors than ‘facts’ 
may explain the New-Keynesian DSGE theory takeover.  
Furthermore, Blanchard’s arguments of ‘facts that do not go away’ as an explanation of the 
almost total takeover of DSGE models is challenged by a timing issue. The empirical 
evidence of monetary policy effectiveness and price stickiness was available at least in 1982, 
and not only in 1997. ‘Facts that do not go away’ was not sufficient to change the point of 
view of macroeconomists in the 80s. Concerning empirical observations a number of points 
are in order: 
Monetary policy is effective. Statistics on inflation, federal funds rate, monetary aggregates, 
output, and unemployment during Volcker’s disinflationary policy 1980-1982 were available 
and mentioned in the economic policy debates during these and the following years.  
The stylized fact of staggered price rigidity was also known in the 70s and 80s. Go to a 
supermarket and check whether the prices of your favorite consumer goods change every 
week, even in the time of two-digit inflation.  
The stylized fact that the econometric estimate of the velocity of money is not constant did 
not stop monetarism in the 70s and 80s.  
The stylized fact that does not go away of housing price bubbles and of financial crisis 
(Reinhard and Rogoff 2010) was discarded in favor of the consensus of the New Keynesian 
DSGE synthesis before 2008.  
The stylized fact that does not go away of an unstable relationship between inflation and 
output gap (Old-Keynesian versus New-Keynesian Phillips curve) was discarded in favor of 
the consensus of the New-Keynesian DSGE synthesis until now. 
 
3. TESTING MACROECONOMIC THEORY 
3.1. Normative versus Positive Theory 
In view of the change of macroeconomic theories and their ability to explain certain stylized 
facts, but not others, two approaches have been suggested in the literature. Either 
macroeconomic theory need not, cannot, and should not be tested or macroeconomic theory 
need, can, and should be tested.  
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In the first, normative approach, microeconomic, macroeconomic, and general equilibrium 
economic theories are only deductive theories, seeking e.g. the best allocation of scarce 
resources, as a branch of applied mathematics. Deductive theories need not, cannot, and 
should not be tested. For nearly two centuries, many economists, including Walras, Keynes, 
Debreu, and Austrian economists among others, did not design their theories in order to test 
them. Spanos (2009) describes this pre-eminence of theory approach. Economic theories are 
then only thought experiments that allow to derive those real-world phenomena that are 
considered to be most relevant by the researcher in a consistent and logical correct way from a 
number of assumptions. A theory is considered to be better than another one if it has fewer or 
less restrictive assumptions.  
In the second, positive approach, economic theory is designed in a way that the parameters 
of the model can be estimated and their results can be tested. A rejection of the results should 
then lead to a rejection of the theory or at least to a major change of the economic modelling. 
This approach also requires that the parameters are identified. If two distinct sets of 
parameters of a theory predict exactly the same observations (‘observational equivalence’), 
there is an identification problem for testing the theory. Additional data does not help to solve 
this problem, only a change of the underlying theory can lead to a uniquely identified set of 
parameters.  
The above two views corresponded to a division of labour which prevailed until the 90s 
between macroeconomic theorists versus macro-econometricians, with each group being 
unable to master the distinct and highly specialized skills of the other group. 
 
3.2. Controversies and tests of macroeconomic theory 
Can observations of ‘nature’ settle the macroeconomic controversies, as in other fields of 
science? After Latour’s (1988) ‘science in the making’ controversies, ‘nature’ may finally 
settle the controversy where knowledge accumulates into Latour’s (1988) ‘readymade 
science’ in the store of no-longer controversial ‘scientific facts’.  
In Krueger’s (2003, 189) interview, Malinvaud mentions: «It was easy to study problems in 
microeconomic theory, which were well defined, and where a brain educated in mathematics 
could bring contributions. But macroeconomics was a more difficult domain to conduct 
research, because the questions were so involved and had many aspects. Let’s say we were 
not on a clean land.» Econometrics can be viewed as a branch of applied statistics. 
Microeconomics can be viewed as a branch of applied mathematics, dealing with economic 
choices based on applied optimization under constraints. Both of them are ‘well-defined’ and 
likely to follow a cumulative path for knowledge similar to the field of applied mathematics.  
Macroeconomic theory, on the other hand, is related to many social factors: macroeconomic 
policy, political economy, the choice of the design of market institutions, ideology and ideas, 
the vested interests of social groups, structural changes brought by technical innovations, by 
history and by the geopolitics of power and conflicts against nations. Macroeconomics is 
prone, not only to country-period specific knowledge, but also to unstable and non-cumulative 
knowledge and potentially never-ending controversies.  
Furthermore, it is more difficult to test macroeconomic theory than microeconomic theory, 
for a number of reasons: 
 (1) The correlations between macroeconomic time-series are not stable for periods longer 
than 10 to 20 years (40 to 80 quarterly observations). This is caused by structural changes 
such as breaks in the growth of productivity and technical change, changes of exchange rate 
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regimes, changes of regulations on capital flows and cross-border banking and finance 
(financial globalization and its reversal), changes of political preferences for macroeconomic 
policies along with the learning process of structural changes in macroeconomic policy 
transmission mechanisms, changes of trade agreements and current account imbalances, 
demographic transition, wars, and increases of inequalities among others. Boyer (2015) 
describes theses combinations on the various markets as modes of regulation for given periods 
of time in each country, within which an accumulation regime occurs. These regimes may 
then be related to a monetary policy regime (Benati and Goodhart 2010).  
(2) Small samples and small statistical populations. When not pooling time-series and cross-
country observations, the number of observations remains low as opposed to large samples in 
microeconomic data. Structural change may reduce the relevant time dimension of time-series 
further. Natural experiments between comparable countries in order to evaluate causality of 
the effect of a policy treatment are frequent but the number of observations per country is 
very small. Statistical inference is therefore limited. One may compare North versus South 
Korea, Haiti versus the Dominican Republic, but it is hard to find more than two comparable 
countries. 
(3) Natural experiments are not done in isolation: there are always several confounding 
effects. The determinants of economic growth may go up to fifty factors, with up to a dozen 
of different measures of each of the factors (up to 500 explanatory variables). A government 
budget cut appears at the same time as a GDP expansion, because exports increased in the 
short run due to a devaluation of the currency happening at the same time (for expansionary 
austerity in Nordic countries in the 80s). In Ireland in the 1990s, labour market reform occurs 
at the same time as foreign direct investment low-tax incentives and European Union 
subsidies.  
(4) Macroeconomic time-series are persistent. They may have large auto-correlation 
parameters close to one (‘unit-root’). This may lead to spurious regressions. Those spurious 
regressions can be published on the ground that the statistical power of unit root tests is small 
for small samples, such as forty years of quarterly data.  
(5) All macroeconomic variables are endogenous (except geography and rainfall or 
information in the remote past). Testing macroeconomic theory faces the lack of 
identification, arbitrary identification restrictions, and weak identification using weak 
instrumental variables. Macroeconomic monetary and fiscal policy and their endogeneity and 
interactions with expectations complicate the estimations of macroeconomic policy effects. 
 
3.3. A useful normative theory can be a useless positive theory 
To highlight the problem of observational equivalence and identification we can take the 
example of a theory that predicts a linear relation between two variables (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡), where the 
number of reduced-form parameters, here 𝛽, is lower than the number of structural 
parameters. In the example below, the theory predicts that the weighted sum of two structural 
parameters denoted (𝑎, 𝑏) is equal to 𝛽:  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1, where 𝛽 = 2𝑎 + 𝑏 and 𝜀𝑡 is 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2). 
From a normative theory point of view, this theory is useful, because one can explain 
comparative statics to undergraduate students. A 10% change of parameter 𝑎 ceteris paribus 
(with 𝑏 unchanged) has a different effect of 𝑦 on 𝑥 than a 10% change of 𝑏 with 𝑎 unchanged. 
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The theory may satisfy useful criteria and principles from a normative point of view, such as 
microeconomic foundations or rational expectations.  
From a Koopmans or Cowles Commission positive economics point of view, this theory is 
useless, because it is impossible to distinguish using data the effect of 𝑎 (ceteris paribus) from 
the effect of 𝑏. It is also impossible to distinguish this theory from an infinite set of alternative 
theories that are observationally-equivalent, where the reduced-form parameter is any 
function of any finite or infinite number of structural parameters. This is such an obvious case 
of a useless under-identified model with too many structural parameters with respect to the 
number of reduced form parameters, that it is never mentioned in econometrics textbooks. 
 There is observational equivalence for the reduced-form parameter function of two 
structural parameters when at least two distinct sets of values of structural parameters (𝑎, 𝑏) 
provide the same prediction:  
?̂? = 1 ⇒ 𝑎 =
?̂? − 𝑏
2
=
(1 − 𝑏)
2
. 
For an estimated value of the reduced-form parameter ?̂? = 1, there is an infinity of pairs of 
structural parameters (𝑎, 𝑏) such that 2𝑎 + 𝑏 = ?̂? that predict the same observations; take e.g. 
b = 0 and a = 1/2 or 𝑏 = 1 and 𝑎 = 0. To estimate one of the two structural parameters 
(𝑎, 𝑏), the researcher needs an additional theory justifying an additional identification 
restriction, such as 𝑏 = 2. Then, he can estimate the other parameter: ?̂? = (?̂? − 2)/2. A 
useful normative theory can be a useless positive theory with too many parameters.  
Since empirical observations alone are not enough to distinguish between different theories 
with the same estimated parameter values other selection criteria have to be found. One 
criterion has already been mentioned in Aristoteles physics twenty-five centuries ago, was 
taken up by Thomas of Aquino in 13th century, and is known in the literature as Ockham’s 
razor, following William of Ockham (14th century): among all theories with exactly the same 
predictions, the simplest theory with the lowest number of parameters has to be chosen.
1
 
The design of a positive theory has to go hand in hand with the precise design of the 
identification of its parameters in its empirical test, taking into account the availability of data. 
But academia may reward the quick and dirty ‘imprecise’ positive validation of a fascinating 
normative theory. 
3.4. Testing optimal growth and convergence 
As a first example of the under-identification of a normative theory which is observationally 
equivalent to a pre-existing theory, we will briefly discuss the estimations and tests found in 
the optimal growth literature. Cross-country convergence in the Ramsey-Cass Koopmans 
                                                             
1 The divergence between normative versus positive knowledge facing Ockham’s razor, 
being an old issue, is much broader than macroeconomic theory. For ‘positive’ science, God 
is an unnecessary hypothesis for the theory of celestial mechanics, according to Laplace’s 
answer to Napoleon and for Darwin’s theory of evolution. Aquinas’ (1920, part 1, Q.2) 
second objection on the existence of God is: «Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what 
can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that 
everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did 
not exist.» But this does not imply that God does not exist. God is a necessary assumption for 
‘normative’ or teleological theology (van Inwagen 2005, Glass 2016). 
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optimal-growth model in the 1990s was tested by regressing the growth of gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita on an initial level of GDP/head. A meta-analysis found the 
estimated parameter on average around ?̂? = 2% for the period 1960-2000 (Abreu et al. 2005). 
At least two competing theories may lead to the same reduced form regression.  
For the closed-economy model with a constant savings rate (Solow-Swan), the reduced 
form convergence parameter 𝛽 depends on four structural parameters: the elasticity of capital 
in the production function, 𝛼, the growth rate of labour, 𝑛, the growth rate of labour-
augmenting technical change, 𝑥, and the depreciation rate of capital, 𝛿 (Barro and Sala-I-
Martin 2004, 112): 
 𝛽(𝛼, 𝑥, 𝑛, 𝛿) = (1 − 𝛼)(𝑛 +  𝑥 + 𝛿) constant savings rate (Solow model).         (1) 
 For the optimal-growth closed-economy model (Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans), the reduced 
form convergence parameter 𝛽 depends on six structural parameters: the same four 
technological parameters as in the Solow-Swan model and two utility parameters of the 
representative generations of consumers. Utility and preferences of generations of the 
representative consumer include the discount rate over generations, 𝜌, and the relative 
fluctuation aversion parameter, 𝜃, (Barro and Sala-I-Martin 2004, 111): 
𝛽((𝛼, 𝑥, 𝑛, 𝛿), (𝜌, 𝜃))  
=
1
2
{𝜁2 + 4(1 − 𝛼) (
𝜌+𝛿+𝜃𝑥
𝜃
) [(
𝜌+𝛿+𝜃𝑥
𝛼
) − (𝑛 + 𝑥 + 𝛿]} −
𝜁
2
,                  (2) 
𝜁 = 𝜌 − 𝑛 − (1 − 𝜃)𝑥 > 0. 
In the case when (𝜌 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑥)/𝜃 = 𝛼(𝑛 + 𝑥 + 𝛿), the optimal-growth convergence 
parameter is identical to the constant savings-rate convergence parameter (Barro and Sala-I-
Martin 2004, 109). 
 To identify the model a number of assumptions and additional estimations have been 
proposed: Ramsey (1928) argues against discounting future generations on an ethical 
principle of equality among generations which leads to the assumption of 𝜌 = 0. The growth 
rate of the population 𝑛 can be easily computed. The growth rate of labour-augmenting 
technical change 𝑥 can be found by estimating a production function, although the measure of 
the stock of any type of capital (physical or human) depends on judgments on the depreciation 
of the variety of capital goods, 𝛿.  
This leaves two structural parameters to be identified, namely 𝛼, measuring the curvature of 
the production function, and 𝜃, measuring the curvature of the utility function. They indicate 
the degree of concavity or the extent to which the production function and the utility function 
differ from a linear function. The first one, 𝛼, is the return to scale of any kind of capital that 
can be accumulated without instant depreciation. When the returns to scale tend to one, 
convergence is extremely slow. The second one, 𝜃, is the relative aversion of fluctuations of 
consumption (the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution). When the relative 
aversion to fluctuations tends to infinity, convergence is extremely slow.  
The design of the convergence test does not allow to distinguish utility curvature 𝜃 from 
production curvature 𝛼. There is observational equivalence for a given convergence parameter 
?̂? = 2%: it may correspond to large returns to capital with a low relative fluctuation aversion 
and conversely. Because of under-identification with too many structural parameters, the 
convergence hypothesis test cannot test the exogenous savings rate (Solow growth model) 
versus endogenous savings (Ramsey, Cass, Koopmans optimal growth model).  
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The key achievement of normative optimal growth theory (utility characteristics matter) is 
forgotten in the positive convergence hypothesis empirical literature, which is nonetheless 
described in textbook to be the closest empirical test of neoclassical growth theory (Barro and 
Sala-I-Martin 2004, 466). The contribution of Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans-Malinvaud optimal 
growth theory is to state that utility matters due to preferences for smoothing consumption 
over time and generations. Utility matters in normative theory but not in the positive theory 
testing the convergence hypothesis. 
 
4. ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS VAR VERSUS RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS DSGE 
4.1. Two competing approaches 
In this section we will analyze the problem of observational equivalence and identification 
for DSGE models in more detail. To do this, we will compare the DSGE approach with 
adaptive expectations vector auto-regressive models. The econometric estimations of systems 
of dynamic equations of macroeconomic time-series, named vector auto-regressive (VAR) 
models, expanded among others into structural VAR (SVAR, Kilian and Lütkepohl 2017), 
cointegrated VAR (CVAR), panel VAR and global VAR (GVAR). These approaches, which 
are also dynamic, stochastic, general and equilibrium models, provide competing empirical 
macroeconomic explanations.  
Most of the SVAR published papers refer to adaptive expectations ‘simple’ macroeconomic 
theories when explaining the statistical significance of impulses responses functions. SVAR is 
not a particular macroeconomic theory. It is a statistical method to test alternative 
specifications and restrictions of existing macroeconomic theories against each other. There 
remains a need for SVAR «to bridge the gap between theory and data by developing 
structural models beyond the ones associated with data-induced restrictions» (Spanos 2009, 
11). Inventing these theories may be grounded on cost-benefit analysis (microeconomic 
foundations), on rule-based behaviour (agent-based models) or any other criteria different 
than only fitting CVAR.  
Juselius and Franchi (2007), Spanos (2009) and Poudyal and Spanos (2016) contrast a 
‘theory first’ or ‘pre-eminence of theory’ approach and a ‘data first’ approach. In a ‘theory 
first’ approach the facts should adjust to the theory such as in rational expectations New-
Keynesian DSGE theory. In a ‘data first’ approach such as in structural or co-integrated 
vector auto-regressive models (SVAR or CVAR) the specification of the macroeconomic 
theory has to change due to econometric results found using data. Juselius and Franchi’s 
(2007) replication of Ireland’s (2004) real business cycle (RBC) model and Poudyal and 
Spanos’ (2016) replication of Smets and Wouters (2007) show how a careful investigation of 
the properties of time-series lead to suggestions to change the specifications of the 
corresponding DSGE theory considerably.  
Central banks’ research departments and academia use both, DSGE models and VAR 
models. In the private banking sector, however, VAR and other econometric methods are 
employed for forecasting rather than New-Keynesian DSGE models. Colander (2009) asks 
why New-Keynesian DSGE theory is ‘more successful’ as a theory-first approach than data-
first approach of co-integrated vector auto-regressive models (C-VAR) or structural VAR 
models. He suggests that New-Keynesian DSGE theory may not require ‘judgment’ and may 
be more fitted for natural selection in academic journals and the academic labour market and 
academic ‘social replication’.  
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But empirical work and VAR also qualify for academic and central banks’ research 
department careers, as much as New-Keynesian DSGE theory. A p-value below 5% leads to 
statistical significance for parameters or impulse response functions is easy to reach with large 
sample and multiple testing. It does not require judgment as a criterion for publishing a 
research paper (Wasserstein and Lazar 2016). Colander’s (2009) argument of ‘social 
replication’ explanation for the success of DSGE models is not so obvious.  
The success of the VAR approach, as well as empirical research pooling cross-country 
macroeconomic time-series, another data-first approach, is mostly explained by technical 
change. The increased computational capacities, the instantaneous and free access of 
economic data on the web (without the time-consuming issue of typing them), the ease of use 
of statistical software with online help, and open source free software, created a crowd of 
young applied econometricians. All graduate students in economics are able to obtain quickly 
statistical results which were primarily the production of near-genius Nobel-prize level 
researchers in the 30s-60s and then of engineer-like nerds using mainframe computers in the 
70s-80s. Technological change also benefited DSGE models, especially with the Dynare 
software, but to a lesser extent. Overall, this decreased the market share of academic 
publications of small-size closed-form macroeconomic theoretical models which do not 
require simulations. This market share was very large before Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) 
real business cycle simulations.  
In addition to Colander’s ‘social replicator’, a number of arguments can be found to explain 
why neither VAR nor DSGE managed to eradicate the other approach from macroeconomic 
research.  
There is no conclusive empirical test of adaptive expectations against rational expectations. 
For every linear rational expectations DSGE model, there is an observationally equivalent 
adaptive expectations VAR model. Data and econometrics cannot and will never be able to 
settle the controversy between adaptive and rational expectations.  
Some models, however, are better specified than others to match macroeconomic data. RBC 
models, since they include only structural parameters, are misspecified with respect to 
macroeconomic time-series persistence. The time series are often auto-correlated with two 
lags (AR(2)), with hump-shaped impulse response functions following shocks. DSGE 
modelers shifted to a hybrid model of rational expectations DSGE and (ad hoc) adaptive 
expectations VAR.  
The adaptive expectations part of the DSGE model deals with the auto-correlation of an 
order at least equal to two of the observable macroeconomic time-series. Each observable 
time-series depends linearly on ad hoc (free) parameters for its lags (for example, habit 
persistence and inflation indexation) and for the auto-correlation parameter of its exogenous 
shock. It is assumed that these reduced-form parameters do not depend on policy-rule 
parameters. This assumption rules out Lucas’ (1976) critique for the modelling of persistence 
in DSGE models. This adaptive-expectations part is observationally equivalent to an adaptive-
expectations VAR including at least two lags without assuming the auto-correlation of the 
exogenous shocks. The forecasting performance of this hybrid DSGE is widely driven by its 
adaptive-expectations VAR part, sometimes up to 99%, when the observed macroeconomic 
time-series auto-correlations are close to unit roots. Coincidentally, at least half of the 
estimates of the auto-correlation parameters of shocks are usually close to unit root (between 
0.95 and 0.998) in DSGE models. 
 The rational expectations part of the DSGE model mostly deals with the cross correlation 
among macroeconomic time series. The structural rational expectations part of the model has 
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a marginal share of the forecasting ability of the model. To check this, one needs only to get 
back to the misspecified model setting all persistence free parameters to zero. In this part, 
reduced form parameters are highly non-linear functions of structural parameters. Hence, it is 
especially this part that contributes to the opacity of the weak identification issues.  
With observational equivalence and the lack of identification or weak identification, a 
researcher does not receive a signal from a statistical software when there is a parameter 
identification problem while the parameters (using the t-test) may be significant. A weakly 
and/or not identified theory is likely to be successful, because the desired parameters are more 
easily statistically significant (any value may actually be estimated in some cases). The 
identification opacity allows the model to be ‘not even wrong’ with respect to its estimations 
of structural parameters. This leads to Gresham’s law for preferring non-identified and weakly 
identified theories, a topic that will be discussed later in section 5.  
The solutions of rational expectations DSGE models and their interpretations are way more 
complicated than the ones of adaptive expectations models. Opaque identification issues of 
structural parameters do not arise with adaptive-expectations VAR models. Ockham’s razor 
argument is to seek the simplest model for observationally equivalent models with the 
simplest explanation. This is the reason why DSGE models, despite being grounded on the 
cost-benefit analysis of microeconomic theory, did not eradicate VAR models. The results of 
VAR models are relatively easy to interpret as opposed to DSGE models. Their identification 
issues are less opaque (Kilian and Lütkepohl 2017). Rational expectations and micro 
foundations are an unnecessary hypothesis for VAR modelers. 
 
4.2. Observational equivalence 
To show the observational equivalence of adaptive and rational expectations, consider the 
following class of hybrid linear macroeconomic DSGE models as stated in Koop et al. (2013): 
𝑨0 (𝜃)𝒚𝑡 = 𝑨1 (𝜃)𝑬𝑡  (𝒚𝑡+1) + 𝑨2𝒚𝑡−1 + 𝑨3 (𝜃)𝒙𝑡  + 𝒖𝑡, 
   𝒙𝒕 = 𝝓𝑥𝒙𝑡−1 + 𝒗𝑡 and 𝒖𝑡  = 𝝓𝑢𝒖𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝑡.                                         (3) 
The parameters of the model, 𝜃, are derived from the underlying theoretical model, e.g. 
maximization of utility and technology; they are sometimes called deep parameters. 
Endogenous variables are denoted 𝒚𝑡, observable exogenous variables 𝒙𝑡, non-observable 
exogenous variables 𝒖𝑡, and independently and identically non-correlated shocks 𝒗𝑡 and 𝜺𝑡. 
Endogenous aggregate variables depend on rational expectations 𝑬𝑡(𝒚𝑡+1) for a proportion of 
of economic agents and on adaptive expectations 𝒚𝑡−1 for the remaining proportion of 
economic agents. The reduced form parameters are given in matrices 𝑨0(𝜃), 𝑨1(𝜃), 𝑨3(𝜃), 
depending on the parameters 𝜃, and exogenous matrices 𝑨2, 𝝓𝑥, and 𝝓𝑢. An important 
restriction, common to most of the estimated DSGE models, is that the stock-flow equations 
of endogenous state variables (the stocks of wealth, capital, public and private debt) including 
the feedback rules of optimal control by economic agents are replaced by the auto-correlation 
equations of exogenous predetermined variables 𝒙𝑡 and 𝒖𝑡.  
Assuming 𝑨0(𝜃) to be non-singular and using the method of undetermined coefficient, the 
solution of this model is (Binder and Pesaran 1997): 
𝒚𝑡 =  𝑪(𝜃)𝒚𝑡−1 + 𝑮1(𝜃, 𝝓𝑥)𝒙𝑡 + 𝑮2(𝜃, 𝝓𝑢)𝒖𝑡                       (4)  
where 𝑪(𝜃) is a solution of the following quadratic equation:  
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𝑨1(𝜃)𝑪(𝜃)
2 − 𝑨0(𝜃)𝑪(𝜃) + 𝑨2 = 0.                               (5)  
Using the assumption that observable and unobservable exogenous variables follow a 
VAR(1), this solution is observationally equivalent to a VAR(1) where expectations are 
adaptive. Pesaran (1981, 376) shows that «in the absence of a priori restrictions on the 
processes generating the exogenous variables and the disturbances, the rational expectations 
and the general distributed lag models will be observationally equivalent; therefore, the auto-
regressive and rational methods of expectations formation, cannot be distinguished from each 
other empirically.» For any rational expectations DSGE model, there is an observationally 
equivalent adaptive expectations VAR model. There is no conclusive test of adaptive versus 
rational expectations. To enlighten the point further the example of inflation persistence is 
analyzed in more detail 
4.3. Inflation persistence 
4.3.1. Adaptive expectations VAR models 
Five different models with adaptive expectations are distinguished.  
(1) Model ℳ𝐴1 is the Old-Keynesian AR(1) theory of inflation persistence which assumes 
backward-looking adaptive expectations so that inflation 𝜋𝑡 is an auto-regressive process of 
order 1 with an auto-correlation parameter 𝜆 and a disturbance 𝜀𝑡:  
ℳ𝐴1: 𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝜆𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1 where 0 < 𝜆 < 1 with 𝜋0  given, and 𝜀𝑡 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) 
⇒ 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝜆𝜋𝑡. 
The initial value of predetermined inflation 𝜋0 is given. Inflation expectations are adaptive, 
they depend only on past values of inflation.  
(2) Model ℳ𝐴2 is an auto-regressive (𝜌 ≠ 0) disturbances or latent variable 𝑢𝑡 model. It is 
observationally equivalent to ℳ𝐴1. 
ℳ𝐴2: 𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝑢𝑡+1 and 
𝑢𝑡+1 = 𝜌𝑢𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1, where 0 < 𝜌 < 1  
with 𝜋0  given, and 𝜀𝑡 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) 
⇒ 𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝜌𝜋𝑡+𝜀𝑡+1 and 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝜌𝜋𝑡. 
(3) Model ℳ𝐴3 is an AR(2) model of inflation with white-noise disturbances: 
ℳ𝐴3: 𝜋𝑡+1 = (𝜆 + 𝜌)𝜋𝑡 − (𝜆𝜌)𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡+1. 
 (4) Model ℳ𝐴4 is an AR(2) model of disturbances. It is observationally equivalent to 
model ℳ𝐴3: 
ℳ𝐴4: 𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝑢𝑡+1 and 
𝑢𝑡+1 = (𝜆 + 𝜌)𝑢𝑡 − (𝜆𝜌)𝑢𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1. 
(5) Model ℳ𝐴5 includes a lagged dependent variable along with an auto-regressive (𝜌 ≠ 0) 
disturbances model 𝜀𝑡. 
ℳ𝐴5: 𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝜆𝜋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡+1 and 
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𝑢𝑡+1 = 𝜌𝑢𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1. 
It is observationally equivalent to model ℳ𝐴3: 
𝜋𝑡+1 − 𝜆𝜋𝑡 = 𝜌(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜆𝜋𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡+1 
                        𝜋𝑡+1 = (𝜆 + 𝜌)𝜋𝑡 − 𝜆𝜌𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡+1. 
Inverting 𝜆 and 𝜌 is observational equivalent. Hence, if (𝜌 ≠ 𝜆), there is an identification 
problem between the following two solutions for 𝜆 and 𝜌:  
𝜆 =
𝑆 + √𝑆2 − 4𝑃
2
, 𝜌 =
𝑆 − √𝑆2 − 4𝑃
2
 or 
𝜆 =
𝑆 − √𝑆2 − 4𝑃
2
, 𝜌 =
𝑆 + √𝑆2 − 4𝑃
2
  
with 𝑆 = 𝜆 + 𝜌 and 𝑃 = 𝜆𝜌. 
Introducing both, a lagged dependent variable and an auto-regressive shock (as it is 
commonly done in DSGE models), leads to an identification issue of the auto-correlation of 
the shock. Furthermore, this model is observationally equivalent to an AR(2) model of the 
endogenous variable, with zero auto-correlation of the shock. Hence, any DSGE model 
assuming auto-regressive shocks in each equation (e.g. Smets and Wouters 2007) is 
observationally equivalent to another DSGE model assuming one more lag of each dependent 
variable without an auto-regressive part in the shocks of each equation. 
4.3.2. Rational expectations DSGE models of persistence 
Key element of the New-Keynesian theory of inflation persistence is the New-Keynesian 
Phillips curve (Galí 2015). Inflation is assumed to be forward-looking, without an initial 
condition for inflation. Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) and An and Schorfheide (2007) 
consider two observationally equivalent rational expectations DSGE models of inflation. For 
both models, inflation 𝜋𝑡 is the observed endogenous forward-looking variable with 
potentially exploding dynamics where the growth factor 1/𝛽 >  1 is driven by inflation 
expectations 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1. Both models include independently and identically distributed shocks 𝜀𝑡. 
Without loss of generality, we will assume in the following analysis that the output gap does 
not deviate from zero and that there is no Taylor rule.  
(1) Model ℳ𝑅1 includes a non-observable backward-looking auto-regressive (forcing 
variable) cost-push shock 𝑢𝑡 with an auto-correlation parameter 0 < 𝜌 < 1, with a given 
initial value 𝑢0. 
ℳ𝑅1: 𝜋𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑡 , 0 < 𝛽 < 1, 
𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 , 0 < 𝜌 < 1. 
Initial inflation is not given in model ℳ𝑅1.  
(2) In the hybrid New-Keynesian Phillips curve model ℳ𝑅2 current inflation depends not 
only on expectations about future inflation, but also on lagged inflation with a parameter 𝑏, 
whose boundaries are to be determined. Because it is assumed that a proportion of agents are 
backward-looking, initial inflation 𝜋0 is given.  
ℳ𝑅2: 𝜋𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝑏𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 ,  
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0 < 𝛽 < 1, 0 < 𝑏 < 𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝛽) < 1. 
(3) Beyer and Farmer (2007) compare models ℳ𝑅1 and ℳ𝑅2 to model ℳ𝑅3:  
ℳ𝑅3: 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑎𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 with |𝑎| > 1. 
They demonstrate that the solution of multiple equilibria of this model depends on an i.i.d. 
sunspot shock 𝑤𝑡, thus exhibiting indeterminacy: 
ℳ𝑅3: πt =
1
𝑎
𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡 . 
 The indeterminacy solution of ℳ𝑅3 is observationally equivalent to the determinacy 
solution of ℳ𝑅2. Furthermore, Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) and An and Schorfheide (2007) 
demonstrate that the determinate solution of model ℳ𝑅2 is observationally equivalent to the 
one of model ℳ𝑅1. We will demonstrate in this section that the two determinate solutions of 
rational expectations models ℳ𝑅1, ℳ𝑅2 and the indeterminate solutions of model ℳ𝑅3 are 
observationally equivalent to the adaptive expectations model ℳ𝐴1. This last result is an 
example of Pesaran's (1981) observational equivalence result between rational and adaptive 
expectations.  
(A) Observational equivalence between rational expectations model with latent auto-
regressive variable ℳ𝑅1 and adaptive expectations model ℳ𝐴1: When transforming the model 
ℳ𝑅1 into its matrix form, the eigenvalues can be found on the diagonal of the transition 
matrix, one of them is unstable, 1/𝛽, the other one stable, 𝜌:  
(
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1
𝑢𝑡+1
)  = (
1
𝛽
−
1
𝛽
0 𝜌
) (
𝜋𝑡
𝑢𝑡
) + (
0
1
) 𝜺𝑡.  
According to Blanchard and Kahn’s (1980) unique solution for rational expectations 
models, inflation has to be exactly collinear to the non-observable shock with the parameter 𝑁 
corresponding to the slope of the eigenvector of the stable eigenvalue: 
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝜌𝜋𝑡 =
1
𝛽
𝜋𝑡 −
1
𝛽
𝑢𝑡 ⟹ 𝜋𝑡 =
1
𝜌 −
1
𝛽
 
−1
𝛽
 𝑢𝑡 = 𝑁𝑢𝑡 , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑁 =
1
1 − 𝛽𝜌
> 1. 
Since the shock 𝑢𝑡 is not observable it is not possible to run the regression 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑁𝑢𝑡, which 
is predicted to be exact, with a coefficient of determination equal to 1 and with a negative 
slope (𝑁 <  0). What is observable, however, is the auto-correlation of inflation. 
𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝑁𝑢𝑡+1 = 𝑁𝜌𝑢𝑡 + 𝑁𝜀𝑡+1 =
𝑁𝜌𝜋𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑁𝜀𝑡+1 = 𝜌𝜋𝑡 +
1
1 − 𝛽𝜌
𝜀𝑡+1 ⟹ 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝜌𝜋𝑡. 
But in the above equation, the parameter 1/𝛽, related to expectations, only appears in the 
variance of the disturbances, which does not allow to identify 1/𝛽. The econometrician 
cannot distinguish between the adaptive expectations Old-Keynesian residuals 𝜀𝑡+1 and the 
rational expectations New-Keynesian residuals multiplied by 𝑁: 𝑁𝜀𝑡+1. The model ℳ𝑅1 is 
observationally equivalent to the adaptive expectations VAR model ℳ𝐴1. Table 1 summarizes 
which variable is observed and which auto-correlation parameter can be estimated in model 
ℳ𝑅1.  
Table 1: The Chiasm of the New-Keynesian Synthesis in model ℳ𝑅1  
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 Observed Not observed 
Variable Inflation Cost-push forcing variable 
Auto-regressive parameter Cost-push shock: 0 < 𝜌 < 1 Inflation: 
1
𝛽
> 1 
 
 (B) Observational equivalence between the hybrid rational expectations and adaptive 
expectations model ℳ𝑅2 and the adaptive expectations model ℳ𝐴1.  
To find the unique solution of the hybrid model ℳ𝑅2, we have to solve:  
0 = 𝑃(𝜇) = 𝛽𝜇2 − 𝜇 + 𝛽 assuming 0 < Δ = 1 − 4𝑏𝛽 ⟹ 𝑏𝛽 <
1
4
 
𝜇1(𝛽, 𝑏) =
1
2𝛽
(1 − √1 − 4𝑏𝛽), 𝜇2(𝛽, 𝑏) =
1
2𝛽
(1 + √1 − 4𝑏𝛽). 
There is again one stable and one unstable eigenvalue. 𝑃(1) = 𝛽 − 1 + 𝑏 < 0 , (𝑏 < 1 −
𝛽) implies that 𝜇1 < 1 < 𝜇2. 𝑃(−1) = 𝛽 + 1 + 𝑏 > 0, (𝑏 > −1 − 𝛽, always satisfied if 𝑏 >
0) implies that −1 < 𝜇1 < 𝜇2. For 𝑏 > 0, 𝛽 > 0, 𝛽 + 𝑏 < 1, (then 𝑏𝛽 ≤
1
4
 is satisfied), there 
is a unique rational expectations solution. The unit root for inflation (𝜇1 = 1) can be reached 
in the limit case 𝛽 + 𝑏 = 1 and 𝛽 < 0.5 (Dees et al. 2009). 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜇(𝛽, 𝑏)𝜋𝑡−1 +
1
1−𝛽𝜇(𝛽,𝑏)
𝜀𝑡 .                                                        (6) 
For values of parameters 𝜌 = 𝜇(𝛽, 𝑏), the auto-correlation of inflation and the variances of 
the random disturbances are identical for models ℳ𝑅2 and ℳ𝑅1 (Lubik and Schorfheide 
2006). They are also observationally equivalent to an adaptive-expectations model ℳ𝐴1 with 
the same auto-correlation and the same variance of the shocks (An and Shorfheide 2007, 
Pesaran 1981). Lubik and Schorheide (2006) and An and Schorfheide (2007) state that both 
parameters (𝛽, 𝑏) are not identified, as only the reduced form parameter 𝜇(𝛽, 𝑏) can be 
estimated. One identifying restriction is required. Else, one can identify (𝛽, 𝑏) in another 
specification which includes at least one additional observable regressor which follows an 
auto-regressive process at least of order 2, such as the output gap (Dees et al. 2009) which 
for US data is weakly identified (Mavroeidis et al. 2011). 
4.3.3. Criteria for selecting between observationally equivalent models 
We suggest four criteria for selecting between the adaptive expectations model ℳ𝐴1 and the 
three observationally equivalent rational expectations DSGE models ℳ𝑅1, ℳ𝑅2, and ℳ𝑅3.  
Criterion 1: Micro-foundations of rational behaviour and Lucas critique: All models are ad 
hoc exogenous models of persistence with free parameters for the auto-correlation (𝜆, 𝜌, 𝜇). 
This property is valid independently of the number of equations of the hybrid DSGE model 
(exogenous auto-correlation matrices 𝑨2 and 𝝓𝑢). They are unrelated to the micro-
foundations of rational decisions of private sectors agent. They are assumed to be unrelated to 
a potential feedback effect of the policy rule of policy-makers. They may all face the Lucas 
critique. 
Criterion 2: Parsimony (fewer parameters: Ockham’s razor): This criterion is valid for 
normative and positive theory. Adaptive expectations with only one parameter is better than 
rational expectations with two parameters.  
20 
 
Criterion 3: Identified parameter instead of non-identified parameters for the positive 
theory: This criterion is valid for a positive theory only. Adaptive expectations have an 
identified parameter (the number of structural parameters is equal to the number of reduced 
form parameters), whereas rational expectations have non-identified parameters, requiring at 
least one identifying restriction.  
Criterion 4: A more simple explanation and interpretation for adaptive expectations with 
respect to a more complicated explanation for rational expectations models: The simplicity of 
explanations and interpretations as part of Ockham’s razor argument.  
In model ℳ𝑅2, 𝑏 = 𝜇 − 𝛽𝜇
2 < 𝜇, with an extreme gap 𝜇 − 𝑏 is obtained for around 
𝛽 = 𝑏 = 0.5 leading to 𝜇 =  1. The auto-correlation 𝑏 of the the non-observable proportion of 
adaptive expectations agents has a non-linear effect on the observed auto-correlation of 
inflation, while being always smaller than this observed auto-correlation (figure 1). These 
effects of the hybrid models are more complicated than the observationally equivalent model 
with all agents following adaptive expectations where 𝜇 = 𝑏. 
Figure 1: Observed inflation auto-correlation as a function of its auto-correlation 𝑏 in the 
hybrid model, for its dependence on rational expectations agents: 𝛽 = 0.6 (red), 0.5 (purple), 
0.9 (dark green) and 0 (light green, adaptive expectations). 
 
Model ℳ𝑅3 with its indeterminate solutions (sunspots) is observationally equivalent to the 
other models with determinacy (Beyer and Farmer 2007). Taking into account sunspots 
solutions of indeterminacy complicates even more the interpretations of rational expectations 
hypothesis.  
In model ℳ𝑅1, the observed initial value of inflation is anchored by private sector agents on 
a cost-push variable 𝜋0 = 𝑁𝑢0. Private sector’s agents exactly know the current and future 
values of this auto-regressive cost-push shock 𝑢𝑡 and, at the same time, they cannot observe 
them. Anywhere else than in New-Keynesian macroeconomic theory, this would be an anchor 
that fails, leading to many sunspots, because it is not observed and therefore, imperfectly 
known. In this theory, it is the reverse: a non-observable shock is unique and avoids the 
occurrence of multiple equilibria for initial conditions (sunspots). The non-observable anchor 
𝑢0 of rational expectations New-Keynesian model ℳ𝑅1 has a similar status for the adaptive 
expectations model ℳ𝐴2 as the existence of non-observable God in Laplace’s celestial 
mechanics. Adding one, two or an infinity of auto-regressive non-observable latent variables 
leading to observationally equivalent models is always possible. It may be useful for 
normative theory and useless for positive theory. This is an unlikely and complicated 
explanation which is not required in two other observationally equivalent models. Initial 
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inflation 𝜋0 is given in the adaptive expectations Keynesian model ℳ𝐴1 and for the hybrid 
model ℳ𝑅2 including a proportion of agents with adaptive expectations. 
 
4.4. Parameter identification issues 
Observationally equivalent models do not necessarily imply a lack of identification of one 
of their parameters. As seen in the former examples, two models may be observationally 
equivalent while both models have all their parameters identified, while one or more 
parameters are non-identified in one model, whereas all are identified in the other model, or 
while having one or more parameters non-identified in both models.  
Parameters relating current variables to their expectations are not identified in a number of 
models by Beyer and Farmer (2004) as has been pointed out by Cochrane (2011). This will be 
clarified in the following two examples starting again with the hybrid linear model analyzed 
before: 
𝑨0 (𝜃)𝒚𝑡 = 𝑨1 (𝜃)𝑬𝑡  (𝒚𝑡+1) + 𝑨2𝒚𝑡−1 + 𝑨3 (𝜃)𝒙𝑡  + 𝒖𝑡, 
𝒙𝒕 = 𝝓𝑥𝒙𝑡−1 + 𝒗𝑡 and 𝒖𝑡  = 𝝓𝑢𝒖𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝑡.    
Example 1: 𝑨2 = 0, 𝝓𝑥 = 0, 𝝓𝑢 = 0. 
With neither lags, nor auto-regressive exogenous regressors, the model is a degenerate 
rational expectations model without predetermined variable. Its unique solution is 
observationally equivalent to a random error model without dynamics and expectations: 
 𝑨0 (𝜃)𝒚𝑡 = 𝑨1(𝜃)𝑬𝑡 (𝒚𝑡+1) + 𝜺𝑡 ⇒ 𝑨0 (𝜃)𝒚𝑡 = 𝜺𝑡 ⇒ 𝒚𝒕 = 𝑨0 (𝜃)
−1𝜺𝑡            (7)  
The solution does not depend on 𝑨1 (𝜃). If some of the parameters denoted 𝜃1 appear only 
in 𝑨1(𝜃1, 𝜃0)and not in 𝑨0(𝜃0), they are not identified. They are related to the out-of-
equilibrium unstable eigenvalues.  
Example 2: 𝑨2 = 0, 𝝓𝑥 = 0, 𝝓𝑢 = 𝜌𝑰𝑛. 
Without lags, but with auto-regressive unobservable exogenous regressors, the model 
includes 𝑛 forward-looking variables related to observable variables 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛} and 𝑛 
corresponding non-observable predetermined exogenous auto-regressive forcing variables 𝒖𝑡. 
The matrix 𝝓𝑢 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝜌𝑖) is a diagonal matrix of exogenous auto-correlation coefficients 
𝜌𝑖 , |𝜌𝑖| < 1. Hence, all the eigenvalues of the auto-correlation matrix 𝝓𝑢 are stable. Blanchard 
and Kahn’s (1980) determinacy condition implies that the remaining eigenvalues of the 
matrix 𝑨1(𝜃)
−1𝑨0(𝜃) related to the endogenous part of the model should all be unstable. 
Forward-looking variable are linearly anchored on non-observable forcing variables, with a 
unique matrix 𝑵(𝜃): 
𝒚𝑡 = 𝑵(𝜃)𝒖𝑡 = 𝑵(𝜃)𝝓𝑢𝒖𝑡−1 + 𝑵(𝜃)𝜺𝑡 = 𝑵(𝜃)𝝓𝑢𝑵(𝜃)
−1𝒚𝑡−1 + 𝑵(𝜃)𝜺𝑡 
𝒚𝑡 = 𝜌𝒚𝑡−1 + 𝑵(𝜃)𝜺𝑡 if 𝝓𝑢 = 𝜌𝑰𝑛. 
When all the auto-correlation coefficients are identical, the model is observationally 
equivalent to an ad hoc adaptive expectations model only driven by the exogenous auto-
regressive parameter 𝜌, upon which no economic agent has any influence, despite their 
rational optimizing behaviour. 
 When the exogenous auto-correlation parameters are different (𝜌𝑖 ≠ 𝜌𝑗) as in Smets and 
Wouters (2007), the model is related to economic behaviour only through the matrix 𝑵(𝜃) in 
the hope that identification of all parameters 𝜃 is feasible, which is not always granted. The 
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economic interpretation of the effects 𝑵(𝜃)𝝓𝑢𝑵(𝜃)
−1 of structural parameters 𝜃 on 
observable variables 𝒙𝑡 is opaque. 
 
5. GRESHAM’S LAW FOR THE THEORY OF POSITIVE MACROECONOMICS 
5.1. Against the method of positive economics 
«What do I think of AM [Against Method] today? Well, scientist have always acted as a 
loose and rather opportunistic way when doing research, though they have often spoken 
differently when pontificating about it. By now, this has become a commonplace among 
historians of science.» (Feyerabend 1995, 151)  
When bringing the normative, theory-first, Walrasian New-Keynesian DSGE model to the 
data, an outcome of this theoretical rigor where ‘very few things go’ is an empirical strategy 
which avoids a kind of Popperian falsification of theory-first models, while pretending to do 
this falsification. It uses observational equivalence and the opacity of parameter identification. 
This empirical and inductive poor method is observationally equivalent to (‘as if’) a kind of 
‘many things go’ lack of scientific method on its empirical side. This ‘many things go’ of the 
empirical side of positive theory is the flip side of testing the strict constraints of ‘very few 
things go’ of normative theory.  
Observational equivalence, under-identification and weak identification issues defend the 
academic freedom to try, to assume and to defend any unlikely or unnecessary hypothesis 
which are considered to be interesting for other criteria than the ability to be falsified in 
positive economics.  
But any unlikely and unnecessary hypothesis does not come from anywhere in mainstream 
macroeconomics. The methodological anarchism of ‘many things go’ for positive economics, 
undercover of a seemingly Popperian falsification, is reserved to the happy few in the 
hierarchy of academic power. They have the academic freedom to choose the ‘very few things 
go’ of the normative theory and the ‘many things go’ when bringing it to the data as a positive 
theory. Mainstream macroeconomics is a highly top-down hierarchical field of research where 
the social norm of what is accepted for publication in best academic journals at a given point 
in time is decided in top-10 macroeconomics departments, in the NBER summer institute 
macroeconomics meetings, and in Fed and ECB research departments. For now, ten years 
since the great financial crisis of 2007, there are recurrent claims against a lack of pluralism of 
macroeconomic theory, where New-Keynesian DSGE models are the only game in town. 
Empirical methodological anarchism for the few is compatible with the lack of theoretical 
methodological pluralism for the many.  
Treating openly identification issues leads to modest and disappointing results. It may lead 
to the empirical rejection of New-Keynesian DSGE theory. It is rewarding for the scientific 
careers of theory-first macroeconomists to escape a detailed treatment of identification issues. 
While pretending empirical evidence and Popperian falsification, this strategy maintains 
theory-first Walrasian tradition alive, doing business as usual, with the help of step 1:  
(1) Claim the empirical evidence of some of the propositions derived from the axioms. The 
evidence is grounded on a biased interpretation of observationally equivalent models facing 
exact and weak identification issues.  
(2) Deductive theory instead of inductive.  
(3) Normative as if positive.  
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(4) Coordinate on the axioms of the deductive theory colluding with a network of allies and 
involve a network of stakeholders, such as central bank research departments.  
(5) Defend the axioms of the deductive theory using arguments of authority and hierarchy, 
ideology, political policy rhetoric, in order to force dissenters out of the field of mainstream 
macroeconomics (Romer 2016). 
 
5.2. Opacity and ‘mathiness’ 
This normative-positive empirical approach may go hand in hand with Romer’s (2015) 
‘mathiness’ blurring the interpretation and the understanding of economic theory. We may 
define mathiness as an ambiguous literary discourse, analogies and interpretation of formal 
mathematical models, with a narrative which describes something else or the opposite of the 
working of the formal mathematical model, to get it published, to sell the paper in broadening 
its contribution and its empirical evidence, to convince, and to find new allies.  
‘Mathiness’ in New-Keynesian DSGE modelling is related to technological progress: the 
development of the Dynare software in the 2000s. While easing access to DSGE simulations 
and Bayesian econometrics to new PhD students, many of this DSGE-born generation of 
macroeconomists did not acquire the knowledge and the modeling skills of small scale 
consistent macroeconomic models and the understanding of their mathematical solutions. This 
widened the gap between their literary fairy-tale narrative on the mechanisms underlying the 
impulse response functions of their DSGE models and their effective, obscure, and messy 
mechanisms. These mechanisms are related to several distortions with respect to perfect 
competition equilibrium, while omitting from time to time stock-flow accounting equations, 
assuming that variables such as the capital stock are not observable. «It is often extremely 
hard to understand what a particular distortion does on its own and then how it interacts with 
other distortions in the model. » (Blanchard 2016, 3). 
 
5.3. New-Keynesian DSGE withers 
Will the fate of the New-Keynesian DSGE theory in twenty years be different from that of 
the theories of the 80s? Although Bayesian estimations still deliver plausible parameters in 
many published DSGE papers as of today, the core five equations New-Keynesian DSGE 
model are at odds with macroeconomic facts of the last ten years describing a new 
accumulation regime for OECD countries following the great financial crisis of 2007.  
First, the key transmission equation of monetary policy is the New-Keynesian Phillips 
curve. It plays a similar role as the quantitative theory of money in monetarism. In the 2010s, 
some researchers state that the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (as well as the old Keynesian 
Phillips curve) abandoned them (Mavroeidis et al. 2014, Borio 2017).The instability of the 
velocity of money for the monetary policy transmission mechanism was the argument to 
abandon monetarism in the 1990s. Mavroeidis et al. (2014) surveys the instability of the 
estimates of the slope of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve, which is the key parameter of the 
monetary transmission mechanism of the New-Keynesian DSGE theory. Borio (2017) 
emphasizes the zero correlation between inflation and output in the last ten years.  
Secondly, the intertemporal substitution effect of the interest rate on future output is smaller 
than expected in the US and not different from zero in most of other countries in the world 
(Havranek et al. 2015). The habit persistence parameters are also found to be much smaller, 
and close to zero with microeconomic estimates (Havranek et al. 2017). 
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Thirdly, there is no evidence of the positive-feedback mechanism of Taylor rule within the 
New-Keynesian model because of its lack of identification (Cochrane 2011).  
Fourthly, the assumption of zero net supply of public and private debt in Galí’s (2015) book 
and the omission of the stock-flow debts and capital equations in DSGE econometrics does 
not fit with the increase of debt which occurred in the last thirty years (Borio 2017), altogether 
with the fall of long run interest rates.  
Fifth, the auto-correlation of shocks can be replaced by adding lags of order two or more of 
observable variables, such as inflation, output gap and federal funds rate.  
The new data from a new macroeconomic accumulation regime since 2007 requires new 
models and new policy advice. Macro-prudential DSGE models have not been convincing. 
New technical tools related to big data and enhanced computational power will appear. A new 
generation of researchers have less stakes in DSGE models. New and unexpected dynamic 
stochastic macroeconomic models, with or without equilibrium, will emerge. At the 
beginning, they will be rhetorically presented as a new consensus, upgrading New Keynesian 
DSGE theory, in order to find allies during the transition. But they will not keep the five core 
New-Keynesian DSGE equations. Thousands of New-Keynesian DSGE published papers will 
belong to the history of dead economic theories. There is no guarantee, however, that these 
new macroeconomic theories will take a better care of identification issues instead of seeking 
observational equivalence and identification opacity in order to be successful. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Our point is not to promote data-first against theory-first, but an honest balance between 
theory and data, as proposed by Spanos (2009). This leads to modest but robust empirical 
results, once identification and weak identification issues are taken into account. A theory 
which has not too many parameters has more chances to last than a theory based on specific 
micro-foundations involving several non-testable structural parameters and unexpected sign 
prediction, such as the New-Keynesian Phillips curve. Modest and robust results are not 
demanded by top academic journals. They are not rewarding for researchers.  
As a consequence, testing between macroeconomic theories in order to settle controversies 
has made very little robust progress. For this reason, New-Keynesian DSGE theory is likely to 
face creative destruction as it happened to theories of the 80s.  
A first cost of the New-Keynesian DSGE theory is related to a bias in the allocation of 
talent. A ‘forced consensus’ emphasizes that there is no alternative on the job market for 
current PhD candidates in macroeconomic theory than writing New-Keynesian DSGE 
models. Skeptical PhD candidates with alternative ideas shift to microeconomics or 
econometrics.  
A second cost of the New-Keynesian DSGE theory is that, by its recurrent attempts to force 
consensus while avoiding to consider identification issues in empirical tests, it maintains 
macroeconomic theory as a science in the making, fostering endless controversies. 
Macroeconomic theory does not accumulate at least a few modest and robust results into 
Latour’s ‘ready-made science’, in order to complement, if possible, the resilient 
undergraduate IS-LM model.  
With the identification problem and observational equivalence, we recommend to be rather 
less dogmatic than more dogmatic about economic theories since, as J.M. Keynes put it in a 
letter to Roy Harrod: «Economics is a science of thinking in terms of models joined to the art 
of choosing models which are relevant to the contemporary world.» (Keynes 1938). 
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Table 2: Citations per year (since and including publication year) in Google Scholar, 15th 
December 2017  
Reference Year 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
Friedman 1960 13 21 41 66 101 
Friedman/Schwartz 1963 33 63 127 246 448 
Barro/Grossman 1971 25 44 22 23 34 
Dornbusch 1976 23 94 129 204 182 
Malinvaud 1977 25 75 39 29 37 
Kydland/Prescott 1982  35 114 235 359 
Clarida/Galí/Gertler 1999    294 383 
Woodford 2003    333 490 
Smets/Wouters 2003    168 335 
Smets/Wouters 2007    156 412 
 
The Google scholar database includes many citations errors with citations selected in a list 
of working papers and journals which changes over time. Many working papers series of the 
eighties have not been numerated and are not included in the database. Online working paper 
series expanded to maturity in the decade 2000s. The current population of citing researchers 
in economics measured by registered researchers in Repec database is around 50.000. With 
respect to the eighties, this citing population increased markedly following the increase of the 
number of university students around the world and adding new researchers in economics of 
former communist countries such as China and Russia as well as researchers from emerging 
economies. Hence, 100 citations per year in the 1980s may correspond to 400 citations per 
year in the 2010s in Google scholar database for a similar citation impact in the 
macroeconomic research community at the time.  
In the 1980s, citations are of comparable magnitude for monetarism (Friedman 1960, 
Friedman and Schwartz 1963), fixed-price disequilibrium (Barro Grossman 1971, Malinvaud 
1977), ad hoc rational expectations models (Dornbush 1976) and real business cycles 
(Kydland and Prescott 1982).  
In the 2010s, citations of new-Keynesian DSGE articles or books (Clarida, Galí, Gertler 
1999, Woodford 2003, Smets and Wouters 2003, 2007) citations are at around 400 per year. 
This is also the case for Kydland and Prescott (1982), although genuine RBC models are 
rarely simulated nowadays. Interestingly, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) is still heavily cited, 
although money demand estimations run out of fashion in working papers of central banks 
research departments. This book is also an account of the great depression of the 1930s, with 
has a renewed interest after the great financial crisis following 2007. These citations are not 
necessarily meaningful. They should not be taken as precise measures of the academic impact 
of research. 
 
